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In The S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

GERALD SCANDRETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
11733

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from his conviction in the
Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Merrill C.
Faux, Judge, presiding, of the crime of murder in
the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 25, 1969, the trial was held before
Judge Faux. Appellant plead not guilty to a reduced charge of murder in the second degree. Upon
a hearing of the evidence, as stipulated to by the
prosecution and defense, Judge Faux found Gerald
Scandrett guilty of murder in the second degree.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's
conviction in the Third Judicial District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts presented to the Honorable Merrill C.
Faux, Judge, were entered on stipulation by both
parties. Respondent agrees with the statement of
facts set out in appellant's brief. Respondent wishes
to make an additional statement, however, abou1
the confessions and the manner in which they were
presented at the trial.
This case is uniqUe because no jury was impaneled. The entire evidence and appellant's motion to suppress the recorded confession were presented to Judge Faux.
The appellant, furthermore, made several voluntary statements to the police before a confession
was ever recorded. All of these statements were
presented to Judge Faux. Even though appellant
was intoxicated, the officers who observed him said
that he spoke coherently, appeared to understand
questions put to him, and made intelligent and spontaneous responses to those questions (T. 108).
It should also be noted that it was the appellant
himself who directed the room clerk. to call the
police after the stabbing (T. 106).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S STATE OF INTOXICATION DID
NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF THE REQUISITE MENTAL
CAPACITY TO KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND
VOLUNTARILY W A I VE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.

Appellant contends that the admission into evidence of the alleged confession was reversible
error. He asserts that the confession was made without the benefit of counsel and without a valid
waiver of his constitutional rights. His contention is
premised solely on the fact that because he was
drunk he could not make an intelligent and knowing waiver. Respondent presented evidence showing that the appellant was given his Miranda warnings.
Intoxication affecting an accused's ability to
waive his rights and confess is a question to be determined by the trial judge. Winn. v. State, 44 Ala. App.
268, 207 So.2d 138 (1968). Judge Faux, after a hearing, denied appellant's motion to suppress the confession. He determined that appellant was coherent
and could intelligently and knowingly waive his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel. It
should be noted that appellant's confession was not
ever presented to a jury. The case was presented
on stipulated facts before Judge Faux. The prejudicial consequences of a jury hearing a confession
were not present in this case. This is particularly
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significant when it is noted that the appellant made
voluntary statements before ever being taken into
custody. This point will be discussed separately. This
fact alone is sufficient to distinguish Logner v. North
Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. N.C. 1966). It also can
be distinguished on other grounds. In Logner the defendant was not only intoxicated but also under the
influence of amphetamines. The amount consumed
deprived him of the capacity to even make a statement about the traffic accident in which he was involved. The appellant Scandrett, on the other hand,
was able to tell the story not only once but several
times, and each time the story was coherent and
consistent with the previous telling.
Coherence, rationality, and responsiveness are
all relevant factors in determining the extent of influence that alcohol has on a person when he confesses or waives his rights. In Re Cameron, 68 Cal.2d
487, 439 P.2d 633, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1968). Whether
an accused has intelligently waived his right tc
counsel depends in each case upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Appellant's conduct in the instant case indicated that
he wanted to talk without counsel. In State v. Matt,
444 P.2d 914 (Ore. 1968), the Oregon Supreme Court
held that an intoxicated defendant by his conduct
had waived his right to counsel.
"A verbal acknowledgment of understanding and willingness to talk, followed by conduct
which is consistent only with a waiver of his
right to have his lawyer present, by one who
has been advised of his rights, constitutes an
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effective waiver of his right to counsel at that
stage of the proceeding." Id. at 915

The trial judge in the instant case after listening
to the recording of the confession determined that
it was very coherent and that appellant could knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional
rights. The officers who observed the appellant testified that he spoke coherently, appeared to understand the questions put to him, and made intelligent
a.nd spontaneous responses to those questions (T.
108).
Mere intoxication does not prevent a person
from making a valid waiver. In Fant v. Peyton, 303 F.
Supp. 457 (W.D. Va. 1969), the court held that defendant' s intoxicated condition did not prevent him
from waiving his rights under Miranda. In People v.
Stroud, 78 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1969), a California appellate
court was faced with an almost identical fact situation as in the instant case. Stroud killed his wife
about 6:00 p.m. He called a deputy sheriff who arrived a little after 6:00. Stroud then confessed to the
deputy. Later at 8:30 p.m. a tape recorder was set
up, and Stroud was advised of his rights. He waived
his rights and confessed. At 10:00 p.m., a blood alcohol test was taken. It revealed an alcohol content of
.229 milligrams. Presumably the blood alcohol content would have been somewhat higher earlier
when he made the confessions. After hearing the
conflicting testimony, the trial judge ruled that despite the amount of alcohol, Stroud was able to
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional

rights under Miranda. In affirming the trial judge the
appellate court said:
"Keeping in mind the rule that our review
of the record is not a fact finding process, we
measure the .totality of circumstances in the
light of uncontroverted evidence and the trial
court's resolution of conflicting evidence. About
the only pertinent uncontradicted fact is that
at 10 p.m. defendant's alcohol blood content
was .229 milligrams. But a blood alcohol content
of .229, standing alone, neither proves nor disproves defendant's capacity to understand and
rationalize, since there is no established statutory
or decisional standard correlating blood alcohol
content with cerebral impairment of which this
court can take judicial notice. Consequently the
import of and inference to be drawn from an
alcohol blood content of .229 must rest upon
other relevant evidence." Id. at 276. (Emphasis
added.)

In the present case the defense put on an expert
witness. However, this expert witness had never
observed anyone with a blood-alcohol count above
.1 (R. 74). He admitted that a specified amount of
alcohol in the blood would affect different individuals differently (R. 74, 75, 86), and that it would
be "unprecise" to speculate on the extent of the impairment of Scandrett's mental faculties at .26 (T.
76, 83), and that it would have been "immeasurably"
helpful to have been present and heard and observed him while intoxicated (T. 83).
The blood alcohol content in this case cannot
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be relied upon as the sole factor in determining
whether appellant waived his rights. It does not
prove that appellant's capacity to understand was
substantially impaired. Other relevant factors to be
considered are the accused's response to questions,
his voluntary statements, his manner of speaking,
his syntax, his grammar, and his mode of speech
as revealed by the taped statements. These factors,
along with the blood alcohol level, were considered
by the trial judge. He listened to the taped confession and ruled that Mr. Scandrett had made a
knowing and intelligent waiver, and that the confession was admissible (T. 98-99).
This ruling was correct. In the absence of any
"statutory or decisional standard correlating blood
alcohol content with cerebral impairiment," Judge
Faux wa_s free to recognize and conclude that "much
depends upon the reaction of each individual person," and that appellant's ability to remember and
narrate the incidents of the stabbing in smooth, unslurred speech, as revealed by the tape, was more
conclusive proof of his mental capacity than was
the expert testimony as to what appellant's mental
capacity might have been.
POINT IA
SINCE THE APPELLANT KNOWINGLY. INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HIS CONFESSION WAS
PROPERLY ADMITI'ED IN EVIDENCE.

To render a confession inadmissible, drug or

8
alcohol intoxication must be of such a degree as to
negate the defendant's comprehension and render
him unconscious of what he is saying. If the defendant understands the statements directed to him
and knows what he is saying, the confession is admissible. State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So.2d 369
(1969). There was no evidence presented at the trial
which indicated that appellant was unconscious of
what he was saying. He understood the statements
directed to him and voluntarily waived his rights before he confessed.
A very comprehensive view of the cases on the
subject of the effect of intoxication on the voluntariness of confessions is found in 69 A.L.R.2d 361,
wherein, at page 364, the annotation says:
"The courts are agreed that proof that one
who has confessed to crime was intoxicated at
the time of making a confession goes to the
weight and credibility to be accorded to the
confession, but does not require (at least where
the intoxication does not amount to mania, and
the intoxicants were not furnished the accused by the police or other government officials) that the confession be excluded from
evidence." 69 A.L.R. 2d 631, 364.

This annotation appeared in 1960 and since that
time many cases have considered the question before this Court. Even since Miranda, most of the cases
refer to and approve the rule as stated in the annotation. See: e.g., State v. Cuzzetto, 457 P.2d 204 (Wash.,
1969); State v. Manuel, supra; People v. Green, 105 Ill.
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App.2d 345, 245 N.E.2d 507 (1969). In only three
cases has it been held error to have admitted the
confessions. But in each case the degree of intoxication amounted to mania, i.e., so drunk as to be unconscious of the meaning of his words.
The case on which the appellant places his
greatest reliance is Logner v. North Carolina, supra. Logner, however, was so drunk when arrested that he
could not make a statement about the traffic collision in which he was involved. He was still very
drunk during the afternoon when he was interrogated.
Also in Warren v. State, 44 Ala. App. 221, 205 So.2d
916 (1967) the court said:
"The proof clearly shows that defendant's
intoxication amounted to mania, that is, he
was so drunk as to be unconscious of the meaning of his words, and that such intoxication
rendered inadmissible his confession." Id. at
225, 205 So.2d at 919.

A similar result was reached in State v. Williams, 208
So.2d 177 (Miss. 1968). The defendant's intoxication
had produced mania, and his confession was held
to be inadmissible.
Respondent submits that this standard should be
adopted by this Court in determining whether appellant's confession was voluntary and should have
been admitted. The State further submits that appellant's intoxication did not per se render his confession involuntary and hence inadmissible. His con-
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duct did not amount to mania or render him unconscious of what he was saying. State v. Thornton, 22
Utah 2d 140, 449 P.2d 987 (1969), in an analogous fact
situation, is authority for this proposition.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY CONFESSION GIVEN
TO OFFICER HUNT IS ADMISSIBLE UN D E R
MIRANDA AND IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN HIS
CONVICTION.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) applies only

to custodial interrogations.

". . . the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.

It does not apply to confessions which are voluntary. In writing the opinion for the Court ,Mr.
Chief Justice Warren emphasized:
"There is no requirement that police stop
a person who enters a police station and states
that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or
any other statement he desires to make. Volun-
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teered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today." Id. at
478.

Appellant made several voluntary statements
before he was arrested and taken into custody, and
before he made the confession which is the subject
of this appeal. After Officer Hunt arrived at the hotel
where the stabbing occurred, he found the victim
in the hallway. The appellant and a Mr. Ferguson
were seated on the bed in the room and the door
to the hallway was open. Officer Hunt heard the appellant say: "I did it; I did it; my fingerprints are on
the knife." Subsequently, Captain Ferguson arrived
and placed the appellant under arrest. Officer Hunt
identified appellant as the person who had admitted
stabbing Mr. Trujillo (T. 106-107).
Ample authority exists for the rule that statements made at the scene of the crime are admissible.
See: e.g., Britton v. State, 44 Wis.2d 109, 170 N.W.2d 785
(1969); State v. Jiminez, 22 Utah 2d 233, 451 P.2d 583
(1969); Cash v. State, 224 Ga. 798, 164 S.E.2d 558 (1968);
Miranda v. Arizona, supra.

Appellant's confession is the classic example of
a "threshold" confession, i.e., appellant initiated the
call to the police and blurted out his guilt the
moment an officer appeared on the scene. The confession was spontaneous and unsolicited. It was
given prior to any custodial interrogation; it was
even prior to custody or investigative interrogation.
It was the spontaneous expression of a "free will"
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burdened with guilt. This confession was voluntarily given in the traditional sense and Miranda does
not require its exclusion, but on the contrary,
sanctions its admission as evidence.
This admissible statement when considered in
light of other special circumstances, i.e., there was
no jury, and no prejudice resulted to appellant because of the taped confession, is sufficient to sustain
the conviction in this case. The Supreme Court of
the United States has never reversed a conviction
based in part on an inadmissible confession which
was never before a jury, where there was a prior
admissible confession which would support the conviction. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
recognized that some constitutional errors are harmless.
"We are urged by petitioners to hold that
all federal constitutional errors, regardless of
the facts and circumstances, must always be
deemed harmful. Such a holding, as petitioners
correctly point out, would require an automatic
reversal of their convictions and make further
discussion unnecessary. We decline to adopt
any such rule. All 50 States have harmlesserror statutes on rules, and the United States
long ago through its Congress established for
its courts the rule that judgments shall not be
reversed for "errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties."
28 U.S.C. § 2111. None of these rules on its
face distinguishes between federal constitutional
errors and errors of state law or federal
statutes and rules. All of these rules, state or
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federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as
they block setting aside convictions for small
errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that
they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the
automatic reversal of the conviction." Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967).

In the absence of a controlling mandate from
the High Court, many states have applied the harmless error rule to confessions obtained in violation
of Miranda. In Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968),
the court applied the harmless error rule to a factual
situation almost identical to the instant case. The defendant had confessed to his parents in his own
home before he was arrested. He was later arrested,
given his Miranda warnings, and he confessed while
in custodial interrogation. He was not intoxicated,
but the court held that even assuming that the confession was inadmissible, the error was harmless and
did not require reversal. Id. at 65. The court relied
on a Nevada case, Guyette v. State, 438 P.2d 244 (Nev.
1968). The Guyette court held that failure to advise
the accused of his right to the presence of counsel,
either retained or appointed, constituted harmless
error. The court said:
"Although the High Court has not yet ruled
that the doctrines of harmless error may be
applied to a Miranda warning violation, thP drift
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of its opinions would suggest that the rule of
harmless error may be utilized when any of the
new procedural safeguards, as expressed in
[citations omitted], are breached. We say this
mainly because the constitutional doctrines of
those cases were not given retrospective application, apparently for the reason that a violation may occur without necessarily affecting
the fundamental fairness of the trial. Due process in the traditional sense is not necessarily
denied the accused. The very integrity of the
fact finding process is not necessarily infected
by the violation. The reliability of the evidence
received is not necessarily suspect. Hence, the
rule of "automatic reversal" does not control
appellate disposition." Id. at 248.

The Court then ruled that there was limited room
for a "state court to consider the rule of harmless
error when the procedural safeguards of Miranda are
not fully honored." Id. at 249.
The respondent submits that the facts of this
case provide such a setting. The appellant was not
denied due process of law. No jury considered the
later confession. The appellant had made voluntary
statements which were admissible and not objected
to by defense counsel. The basic tests of reliability
were met in this case. There was no police brutality
or coercion. The appellant was given his complete
Miranda warnings. The evidence shows that even
though intoxicated, the statements made were voluntary. Finally, respondent notes that perhaps the
most damning confession was made prior to interrogation and completely admissible. Due process
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was complied with. The trial judge made an independent determination that the appellant's confession was admissible. But even assuming that this
determination was error, it can be deemed harmless
error and the prior confession can sustain the conviction.
CONCLUSION

Respondent submits that the trial court did not
err in denying appellant's motion to suppress his
confession. The appellant intelligently, knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel under
Miranda. The confession was admissible and the conviction should be affirmed.
Further, the threshold confession was admissible and was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. Assuming that the later confession was inadmissible, the rule of harmless error prevails. There
was no jury and the prejudices which result because of inadmissible confessions were not present
in this case. The conviction must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

